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I
INTRODUCTION
In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Robinson,1 the Texas Supreme
Court adopted  an interpretation of the rules concerning the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony nearly identical to that adopted two years earlier by the United
States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2  The
court affirmed the trial judge’s exclusion of Dr. Carl Whitcomb, the plaintiff’s
only causation expert, who was prepared to testify that the defendant’s con-
taminated fungicide damaged the plaintiff’s pecan orchard.  In a vigorous dis-
sent, Justice Cornyn noted that the expert’s testimony was based in part on a se-
ries of first-hand observations of the orchard.3  He noted that the excluded
testimony “is roughly analogous to that which may be offered by a physician,
who may testify based on nothing more than a personal examination, the pa-
tient’s history, and correspondence with other physicians.”4  Physicians are fre-
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1. 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. The observations were:
(1) many leaves had an unusual coloration or were deformed in shape, but the pattern of oc-
currences were inconsistent with frost damage, insect infestation, or nutrient deficiencies; (2)
many nuts had failed to form properly, but the deformities were not consistent with nutrient
deficiencies or drought; (3) roots had failed to develop normally, but the abnormalities were
inconsistent with freeze damage, drought, or root rot; (4) new growth in the limbs of the trees
had failed to develop normally or had experienced die-back; (5) soil conditions were of ade-
quate depth and consistency to support a pecan orchard; (6) drainage patterns in the orchard
were sufficient to prevent excess accumulations of rainfall that could damage pecan trees; and
(7) insects were not present in any appreciable level.
Robinson,  923 S.W.2d at 562.
4. Id.
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quently called upon to offer opinions identifying an injury’s cause based both
on a physical examination of a patient and the exclusion of other causes of the
patient’s condition.  When this type of testimony is presented by physicians, it
frequently goes by the name of “differential diagnosis,” although some courts
have more appropriately called it “differential etiology.”5
Justice Cornyn may have believed that the expert’s testimony in Robinson
must be admissible because it was so similar to the typical testimony of many
medical doctors.  Such testimony had been employed in tort cases for many
years without criticism from courts or commentators.6  Perhaps, however, Jus-
tice Cornyn foresaw the opposite implication:  If Dr. Whitcomb’s testimony was
inadmissible, it might call into question the differential diagnosis testimony of
many physicians.  Had Judge Cornyn investigated the law review literature
more thoroughly, he would have discovered that such questioning had already
begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s.7  A number of factors seem to have
played a role in this change, among them the increasing use of scientific experts
in court, the rise of toxic tort actions, and renewed interest in the criteria used
to judge the admissibility of expert testimony.  As the 1990s progressed, courts
were presented with more admissibility challenges to differential diagnosis tes-
timony.  There is now a considerable body of case law on point.8
Most would agree that the result of these challenges is a body of evidence
law that creates more barriers to the admissibility of this evidence.9  However,
5. In medical dictionaries, differential diagnosis is defined as “diagnosis based on comparison of
symptoms of two or more similar diseases to determine which the patient is suffering from.”  TABER’S
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 404 (14th ed. 1981).  However, in legal usage, the term is not re-
stricted to the process of distinguishing among diseases.  Rather, the term also is used to describe the
process of differentiating among the possible causes of the plaintiff’s ailment.  It is with respect to this
latter, perhaps incorrect, usage that differential diagnosis has become controversial in legal settings.
Differential diagnosis is defined as “a process whereby medical doctors experienced in diagnostic tech-
niques provide testimony countering other possible causes . . . of the injuries at issue.”  See Cavallo v.
Star Enterprise, 892 F. Supp. 756, 771 n.31 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded, 100
F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996).  Some courts do recognize that the legal usage is contrary to the medical us-
age and employ the more appropriate term “differential etiology” (the study of the causes of disease).
See Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 385 (2d Cir. 1998).
6. A Westlaw search of the term “differential diagnosis” generates 452 cases, the earliest decided
in 1948.  See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 195 P.2d 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948), va-
cated, 203 P.2d 747 (Cal. 1949).
7. For two of the earliest articles discussing differential diagnosis, see Bert Black, A Unified The-
ory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (1988); E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based
Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487 (1989).
8. See, e.g., Raynor v. Merrell Pharms., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Bendectin and
fetal birth defects); Ambrosini v. LaBarraque, 101 F.3d. 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Depo-Provera and birth
defects); Hall v. Babcock & Wilcox, 69 F. Supp. 2d 716 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (exposure to radiation and can-
cer); Pick v. Am. Med. Sys., 958 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. La. 1997) (silicone penile implant and autoimmune
disorder); Golod v. Hoffman La Roche, 964 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Tegison and eye injury);
Berry v. CSX Transp., 709 So. 2d 552 (Fla. App. 1998) (organic solvents and encephalopathy); Norfolk
S. Ry. Co. v Baker, 514 S.E.2d 448 (Ga. App. 1999) (diesel exhaust and nasopharyngeal cancer).
9. Recent articles that discuss differential diagnosis include: Henry Berry, Logical Analysis: A
Method of Examination of Expert Medical Opinion Through the Basic Logic of Medical Reasoning, 34
TORT & INS. L.J. 949 (1999); Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743
(1999); Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 241
(1999); Richard T. Stilwell, Kumho Tire: The Battle of the Experts Continues, 19 REV. LITIG. 193
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there is no complete consensus on the requirements for admitting such testi-
mony.  On the contrary, the case law is unsettled in some regards.10  This lack of
agreement is not surprising, because differential diagnosis testimony attempts
to address some very difficult causal questions, especially when offered in toxic
tort cases.
In this article, we use the differential diagnosis opinions to explore a pair of
interrelationships.  First, we are interested in the relationship between admissi-
bility and causation.  In this regard, it is important to understand that in many
toxic tort cases the center of gravity on causal questions has shifted to an earlier
point in the trial.  No longer solely a question for the jury, causation is resolved
in an in limine hearing before a jury is even empaneled.11  The central point is
that adjective law12 and substantive law do not exist in isolation from each other.
Our goal is to shed light on how admissibility decisions shape causal questions
and, in turn, how causal principles affect admissibility decisions regarding dif-
ferential diagnosis.  Second, we are interested in the relationship between law
and science.  Specifically, we argue that the Daubert decision has caused courts
to be more “scientific” in assessing the admissibility of such testimony.  In Part
II, we present the basic causal framework employed by most courts in toxic tort
cases.  Part III sketches out the admissibility rules developed in Daubert and its
progeny.  Part IV examines the differential diagnosis opinions in the context of
both the causation analysis of Part II and the admissibility rules presented in
Part III.  Part V attempts to explain differences in the opinions based on causal
and non-causal factors.  It argues that a key to understanding the developing
case law in this area is to appreciate the degree to which courts have adopted
the interpretive conventions of science in assessing admissibility.
As we shall see, while some cases simply seem to be wrongly decided, many
cases could go either way.  These cases offer us an opportunity to examine pres-
ent judicial views as to how tight a causal chain plaintiffs must present to state a
prima facie case in this evolving area of law.  The final part offers a few
thoughts on the proper balance between causal clarity and the role of the jury in
tort cases.
(2000); Note, Navigating Uncertainty: Gatekeeping in the Absence of Hard Science, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1467 (2000).
10. See infra Part IV for a discussion of areas of agreement and disagreement.
11. One of the unanticipated beneficial consequences of a renewed judicial interest in admissibility
is that it has generated a large number of cases addressing complex causal questions.  Prior to the rise
of this body of law, causal questions were addressed much less frequently.  Close questions were simply
left to the jury and whatever verdict came out of this black box was rarely overturned on causal
grounds.
12. Adjective law is defined as the body of rules governing procedure and practice.  As opposed to
that body of law which the courts are established to administer (called “substantive law”), it means the
rules according to which the substantive law is administered, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 42 (7th ed. 1999).
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II
CAUSAL ISSUES IN TOXIC TORT CASES
Cause-in-fact in toxic tort cases is usually thought of as two separate issues:
general causation and specific causation.13  General causation asks whether ex-
posure to a substance causes harm to anyone.  Specific causation asks whether
exposure to a substance caused a particular plaintiff’s injury.  Under traditional
tort theory, a successful plaintiff must prevail by a preponderance of the evi-
dence on both issues.14  The plaintiff must not only show that, more likely than
not, the substance causes the injury in question, but also that, more likely than
not, the plaintiff’s specific injury was caused by the substance.15
It would be a mistake to argue that the causal issues in toxic tort cases are
fundamentally different from those presented in other tort cases.  However,
toxic tort cases do differ in degree in several significant ways.16  First, often there
is causal ambiguity.  The level of exposure to a substance or a drug—the dose
rate—is often uncertain.  Evidence of a relationship between the substance and
the injury is often uncertain.17  The timing between exposure and disease may be
suspect.18  These difficulties may create both admissibility and sufficiency ques-
tions.  Second, there is a fundamental problem of multiple causation.  Asbestos,
the subject of the first great toxic tort case,19 is atypical because it causes “signa-
ture” diseases.  Asbestosis and mesothelioma are diseases so strongly related to
asbestos exposure that there is little doubt that a person with these illnesses
who has been exposed to asbestos contracted them because of the exposure.20
Other substances, however, do not cause unique injuries, and substances that do
cause signature diseases may also cause others.21  If, for example, an individual
is exposed to asbestos and develops lung cancer, one cannot be certain that the
exposure caused the disease.  It could be caused by something else, such as ciga-
13. Arguably, these are separate issues in all tort cases.  However, the general causation issue is
often obvious.  That cars striking trees at 60 mph might cause injury to occupants is not a point requir-
ing expert testimony.  See Note, Navigating Uncertainty: Gatekeeping in the Absence of Hard Science,
supra note 9, at 1473.
14. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990). 
15. See Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373 (1991).
16. For useful discussions of the special causal problems arising in toxic tort cases, see Gerald W.
Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of Scientific Proof and the Regula-
tory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181 (1993); David A. Fischer, Successive Causes and the
Enigma of Duplicated Harm, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1127 (1999); Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and
Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substance Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Liti-
gation, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 643 (1992); Mark Parascandola, What is Wrong with the Probability of Cau-
sation?, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 29 (1998); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984).
17. See Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1995).
18. See Heller v. Shaw Indus., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999). 
19. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
20. See Victor Roggli, Asbestos, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY 285-325 (David Faigman et al. eds., 1997).
21. For example, asbestos also causes lung cancer.  See id.
SANDERS_FMT.DOC 06/04/01  1:34 PM
Page 107: Autumn 2001]  DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS TESTIMONY 111
rette smoking.22  Third, and related to the problem of multiple causation, there
is often limited evidence of specific causation, that is, evidence that the sub-
stance caused the injury to this particular plaintiff.23  Plaintiffs may find it diffi-
cult to prove that a particular injury was the result of the defendant’s substance
or another cause.
Courts have provided some solutions to these causal difficulties. The most
noteworthy is the use of general causation evidence, such as epidemiological
studies, to prove or disprove specific causation.24  However, this solution is vi-
able only where there is good evidence on general causation.25  Courts have
been less willing to entertain alternatives permitting  proportionate recoveries
based on the probability that a specific injury was caused by a given exposure,
or collectivized, risk-based claims in mass exposure cases.26  All of these pro-
posed solutions tacitly recognize the difficulty of proving specific causation, and
some explicitly attempt to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proof on this
element.  Because courts have generally refused to relieve the plaintiff from
proving specific causation, differential diagnosis evidence is often a crucial
component of the plaintiff’s case.27  Without some evidence that the substance in
22. See Piero Mustacchi, Lung Cancer Latency and Asbestos Liability, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 277
(1996).
23. In a few areas there is a fourth difficulty, an indeterminate defendant.  The most well-known
situation of this kind is the DES litigation, but the problem has arisen in asbestos and lead paint expo-
sure cases as well.  In the DES context, many courts have provided a special remedy to plaintiffs facing
this problem, the most well-known being market-share liability.  See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d
924 (Cal. 1980).
24. Prior to the emergence of epidemiological evidence in the toxic tort context, some courts
adopted what Professor David Rosenberg called a “strong version” of the preponderance of the evi-
dence rule.  See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law”
Vision of the Tort System,  97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 857 (1984), quoted in In re Agent Orange Prods.
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1261 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).  To prove specific causation, the plaintiff must
offer more than statistical correlation.  See Rosenberg, supra, at 856.  The plaintiff must also offer some
“particularistic” proof of a causal connection.  See id.  Other courts adopted a “weak version” of the
rule.  A verdict for the plaintiff may be supported solely on statistical, that is epidemiological, evidence.
See id. at 857-58.  Over time, the “weak” version has gained ascendancy.  Under this rule, an injured
plaintiff may reach the jury if she can present epidemiological studies indicating at least a doubling of
the risk of injury due to exposure to a substance (a relative risk of 2.0 or greater).  See In re Joint E. &
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 758 F. Supp. 199, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 964 F.2d 92 (2d
Cir. 1992); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958-59 (3d Cir. 1990); Landrigan v. Ce-
lotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1087 (N.J. 1992).
25. In fact, the quality of the general causation evidence varies from very good—the teratogenic
effects of Bendectin—to very poor—whether exposure to jet fuel can cause chronic conjunctivitis.  See
Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1995); MICHAEL GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH
DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996).  The courts have also
been willing to ease the plaintiff’s burden by applying a substantial factor rather than a but-for test in
these cases.  The use of a substantial factor test has often been implicit.  Few if any defendants have
successfully advanced the argument that the plaintiff has failed to show but for causation.  It is inter-
esting that this fundamental issue has received relatively little attention in the present context.  In this
brief article, we set aside any further discussion of but for versus substantial factor causal analysis.
26. See Margaret Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice
and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997); Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of
Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L. J. 376 (1986); Rosenberg, supra
note 24, at 851; David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-
Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 211 (1996).
27. See Lennon v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1154 (N.D. Ind. 2000).
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question caused the specific injury to the specific plaintiff, courts are likely to
grant the defendant summary judgment.  To get this evidence to the jury, the
plaintiff must first pass through the Daubert gate.28
III
DAUBERT, KUMHO, AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE
The question of when to trust an expert is as old as expert testimony itself.29
Prior to Daubert, the most important admissibility opinion was Frye v. United
States.30  In that case, the defendant, accused of murder, offered the results of a
precursor to the lie detector test to prove his innocence.31  The court refused to
admit the testimony based on the test results until the technique was “suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.”32  After the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a
number of federal circuit courts abandoned the Frye test.33  Some circuits, how-
ever, continued to use Frye after the adoption of the Rules.  The Ninth Circuit
was among this latter group.34  In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,35 Jason Daubert and Eric Schuler sued the defendant, the manufacturer of
Bendectin, a morning sickness drug.  They claimed that the drug, taken by their
mothers during pregnancy, caused the plaintiffs’ limb reduction birth defects.36
The trial judge granted the defendant summary judgment after concluding that
the strongest inference a jury could draw from the evidence was that “Bendec-
tin could possibly have caused plaintiffs’ injuries,” a finding insufficient to avoid
28. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
29. See David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring
the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1800 (1994) (reporting that the first clear reference to an expert witness called
by and on behalf of a party occurred in the case of Folkes v. Chadd, 99 Eng. Rep. 589 (1782)).  For
commentary on the history of expert witnesses, see Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considera-
tions Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901); Stephan Landsman, Of Witches, Mad-
men, and Products Liability: An Historical Survey of the Use of Expert Testimony, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
131 (1995).
30. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  Our discussion here borrows heavily from 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (David Faigman et al. eds., 1997).
31. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
32. Id. at 1014.
33. The most influential early circuit court opinion rejecting Frye is United States v. Downing, 753
F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).  In a case involving expert testimony on eyewitness identification, Judge
Becker said that, to be admitted, the evidence must survive the trial court’s preliminary inquiry.  See id.
at 1226.  In an in limine proceeding, the judge should balance the reliability of the scientific principles
the expert employed against the likelihood that the evidence may overwhelm or mislead the jury.  In
addition, the trial court should examine the “fit” between the proffered scientific testimony and the
contested issues in the case.  See id. at 1226.  Concern with reliability and fit have become cornerstones
of post-Daubert jurisprudence.  Another pre-Daubert case that rejected Frye is Christophersen v. Al-
lied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
34. See United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985).
35. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
36. See id.
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granting the defendant’s motion.37  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.38  It
held that the plaintiff’s expert testimony was inadmissible because its underly-
ing methodology diverged substantially from the procedures and techniques
generally accepted in the field.39
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, primarily to announce Frye’s de-
mise.40  The Court held that, although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not in-
corporate the Frye test, they do require more than relevance.41  Rule 702 re-
quires reliability as well as relevance; testimony that is relevant but unreliable is
inadmissible.42  This raises the question:  What constitutes reliability?  In Dau-
bert, where all of the experts purported to be scientists,43 the Court turned to
science for an answer.  Reliable opinions are those reached using the “methods
and procedures of science.”44  The court added that “[i]n a case involving scien-
tific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.”45
Though the Daubert court did not outline a systematic presentation of what
scientists mean when they inquire about validity, it did offer four factors courts
might consider when making a reliability/validity assessment: (1) Whether the
expert’s theory or technique is falsifiable and has been tested;46 (2) the reliability
of a procedure and its potential rate of error;47 (3) whether the theory or tech-
nique has been subjected to peer review48 and the results have been published;49
and (4)  in a partial resurrection of the Frye test, whether the expert’s methods
and reasoning enjoy general acceptance in a relevant scientific community.50  In
addition, the Court noted that Rule 702 requires that expert evidence “assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”51  Justice
Blackmun said that “[t]his condition goes primarily to relevance . . . .  The con-
sideration has been aptly described by Judge Becker as one of ‘fit.’ ‘Fit’ is not
always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scien-
tific validity for other, unrelated purposes.”52  The “fit” requirement involves an
37. Id. at 576.
38. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
39. See id. at 1129-30.
40. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
41. See id. at 589.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 589-90.
44. Id. at 590.
45. Id. at 590 n.9 (emphasis in original).  For a discussion of the complex issue of scientific validity
in the toxic tort context, see Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New
Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715 (1994); Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity, Ad-
missibility, and Mass Torts after Daubert, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1387 (1994).
46. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
47. See id. at 594.
48. See id. at 593-94.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 591.
52. Id. (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)).
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assessment of whether the expert’s chain of reasoning contains an inferential
gap that is too wide.53
The Court expressly limited this holding to scientific evidence.54  In addition,
the opinion clearly stated that the four reliability factors—testability, error rate,
peer review and publication, and general acceptance—are not exclusive.55
These positions present two related questions to post-Daubert courts:  Does
Daubert’s reliability requirement apply at all to non-scientific evidence and, if it
does, what role do the Daubert factors play in these cases?
Many courts concluded that Daubert did apply to non-scientific testimony,
but often they could not agree about the proper role of the Daubert factors.
Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc.56 provides an instructive example.  In Moore,
the plaintiff became ill after he was forced to clean up a spill of solvents inside
the back of a truck.57  The trial judge excluded the causation testimony of one of
his experts, a specialist in pulmonary, environmental, and internal medicine,
which stated that one hour of exposure caused the plaintiff to contract reactive
airways dysfunction syndrome.58  The plaintiff appealed, and the Fifth Circuit
reversed, ruling that the exclusion was in error.59  It held that, while the Daubert
53. Sometimes “fit” may be understood to refer to the relationship between the general question
asked by a line of research and the question in the case.  Judge Becker provides an example:  “[A]nimal
studies may be methodologically acceptable to show that chemical X increases the risk of cancer in
animals, but they may not be methodologically acceptable to show that chemical X increases the risk of
cancer in humans.” In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 743 (3d. Cir. 1994).
Courts may also find a lack of fit when the studies presented by the expert simply fail to support the
expert’s position.  Using the “fit” requirement in this way causes courts to move closer to excluding an
expert’s testimony because of the expert’s conclusion. This is something the Supreme Court in Daubert
specifically cautioned against when it said that the focus of the 702 validity inquiry “must be solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
Most appellate courts downplayed the Supreme Court’s methodology-conclusion distinction.  For
example, in an important Paoli opinion following Daubert, Judge Becker himself said “we think that
[the distinction between principles and methods versus conclusions] has only limited practical im-
port. . . . [A] challenge to ‘fit’ is very close to a challenge to the expert’s ultimate conclusion about the
particular case, and yet it is part of the judge’s admissibility calculus under Daubert.”  In re Paoli, 35
F.3d at 746.
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the Supreme Court endorsed Judge Becker’s
view:
[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit
opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.  A
court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered. 
Id. at 146.
54. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8.
55. See id. at 594 n.12.
56. 126 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 1997), rehearing en banc granted, opinion vacated, 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir.
1998).
57. See Moore, 151 F.3d at 271-72.
58. See Moore, 126 F.3d at 699-700.
59. The appeal followed a trial on the merits.  See id. at 679.  The case went to trial because the
trial court did allow the plaintiff’s treating physician to testify on causation.  This was a strange pair of
rulings because, as the appellate court notes, most of the testimony of the treating physician was based
on the tests and assessment of the excluded witness.  See Moore, 151 F.3d at 269, 288 n.6.  The jury re-
turned a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed, and the Fifth Circuit panel reversed and re-
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standard applied to all expert evidence, the Daubert factors are “hard” science
methods or techniques that should apply only to experts who profess to base
their testimony on “hard” science knowledge.60  These criteria should not be
used to judge the admissibility of a clinical physician’s expert testimony.61
Rather, such testimony should be judged by the principles and methodology of
the field of clinical medicine.62  After an en banc review, the circuit reversed and
reinstated the judgement for the defendant.63  The en banc opinion turned pri-
marily on a “fit” analysis.  However, it also supported the use of Daubert factors
when assessing the admissibility of clinical medical testimony.64
The proper role of the Daubert factors has arisen in other areas where the
expert’s testimony rested on professional “experience.”  For example, the issue
presented itself with respect to forensic testimony in the criminal context65 and
products liability design defect testimony.66  The Supreme Court finally inter-
manded.  See Moore, 126 F.3d at 679.  This determination resulted in an order granting a rehearing en
banc.  See id.
60. Moore, 126 F.3d at 682.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 701.  Some commentators share the view that clinical medical causation testimony
should not be covered by the Daubert factors.  See, e.g., Ellen Relkin, Some Implications of Daubert
and its Potential for Misuse: Misapplication to Environmental Tort Cases and Abuse of Rule 706(a)
Court Appointed Experts, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2255, 2258-59 (1994).
Medical doctors practice clinical medicine and not experimental science.  Other than pharma-
ceutical clinical trials, physicians typically do not conduct experiments on patients with toxic
substances. Accordingly, a number of the “preliminary questions” set forth by the Supreme
Court in Daubert have little or no bearing on the practice of medicine and treating physicians’
actual diagnosis of disease and its etiology. . . .
Certainly, doctors who diagnose and treat patients with life-threatening conditions should be
able to testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to the diagnosis and cause of a
disease.  However, the methodologies and modalities employed by the physician do not al-
ways “fit” within the paradigm of falsifiability, refutability, and testability, set forth in the
majority opinion of Daubert.
Id.
63. See Moore, 151 F.3d at 279.
64. See id.
65. See United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997) (agreeing that handwriting experts are
not scientists but affirming a trial judge’s decision to admit handwriting testimony, in part because his
past experience as a witness was evidence that his testimony is reliable); United States v. Starzecpyzel,
880 F. Supp 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that handwriting experts are not practicing science within
the meaning of Daubert because they do not test their theories and their findings have unknown error
rates).  In the aftermath of Kumho, however, at least one federal district court has refused to allow the
government’s handwriting expert to testify that the defendant was the author of a note used in a bank
robbery.  See United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999).
66. See Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d. 1513 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Daubert
factors are inapplicable in a products liability design defect context); see also Talkington v. Atria Re-
clamelucifers Fabrieken BV (Cricket BV), 152 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998); McKendall v. Crown Control
Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1997).  Not every court agrees, however.  For example, in Watkins v.
Telsmith, Inc., the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Daubert factors do apply.
[T]he nonexclusive list of factors relevant under Daubert to assessing scientific methodology—
testing, peer review, and “general acceptance”—are also relevant to assessing other types of
expert evidence.  Whether the expert would opine on economic valuation,  advertising psy-
chology, or engineering, application of the Daubert factors is germane to evaluating whether
the expert is a hired gun or a person whose opinion in the courtroom will withstand the same
scrutiny that it would among his professional peers. . . . Further, it seems exactly backwards
that experts who purport to rely on general engineering principles and practical experience
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vened in this debate in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.67  In July 1993, eight
members of the Carmichael family were involved in a serious automobile acci-
dent when the right rear tire of their minivan blew out.68  After the accident, the
plaintiffs’ expert examined the tire and concluded that the failure was not the
result of any abuse.69  He therefore concluded that the failure was caused by a
defect in either the tire’s design or its manufacture.  Prior to his testimony,
however, the expert became ill and transferred the case to his employee, Dennis
Carlson, who reviewed the file and confirmed the initial conclusion.70  Carlson
did not personally examine the tire before rendering his opinion; he first in-
spected the tire approximately one hour before his deposition.71  The defendant
moved to exclude Carlson’s testimony for failing to satisfy Daubert.72  The trial
judge agreed, finding that “none of the four admissibility criteria outlined by
the Daubert court are satisfied in this case.”73  Because the expert testimony was
the plaintiffs’ only evidence of defect, the district judge then granted the defen-
dant summary judgment.74  The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district
court should not have applied Daubert’s reliability framework because Carlson
was not a “scientific” expert.75
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit undertook a de novo review of the trial
court’s decision to apply Daubert.76  The court concluded that Daubert applies
only to scientific testimony, that Carlson’s testimony was non-scientific, and that
the district court erred as a matter of law in applying the Daubert criteria.77  The
Eleventh Circuit declared itself prepared to affirm a well-reasoned trial court
decision to exclude Carlson’s testimony on reliability grounds if, upon remand,
the trial court did so without invoking the Daubert criteria.78  However, in an-
other part of the opinion, the appellate court said that the question in this case
is whether Carlson’s testimony is based on his application of scientific principles
or theories (which we should submit to a Daubert analysis) or on his utilization
of personal experience and skill with failed tires (which we would usually expect
might escape screening by the district court simply by stating that their conclusions were not
reached by any particular method or technique.  The moral of this approach would be, the less
factual support for an expert’s opinion, the better.
121 F.3d 984, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th
Cir. 1996).
67. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  Between Daubert and Kumho, the Supreme Court decided General Elec-
tric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).  In Joiner, the Court concluded that the trial court’s Rule 702
holdings should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 137.
68. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1434 (11th Cir. 1997).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1520 (S.D. Ala. 1996)
73. Id. at 1521.
74. See id. at 1524.
75. See Carmichael, 131 F.3d at 1435.
76. See id. at 1435.
77. See id. at 1435-36.
78. See id. at 1436 n.9.
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a district court to allow a jury to evaluate).79  This sentence suggests that the
court believed that a more lenient admissibility standard was appropriate for
non-science experts.
The trial court, however, never had a second chance to evaluate the testi-
mony.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the Eleventh Circuit,
and held that excluding Carlson’s testimony was not an abuse of discretion.80  As
to the role of the Daubert factors, the Court adopted a flexible position:
We also conclude that a trial court may consider one or more of the more specific fac-
tors that Daubert mentioned when doing so will help determine that testimony’s reli-
ability.  But, as the Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is “flexible,” and
Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all ex-
perts or in every case.  Rather, the law grants a district court the same broad latitude
when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reli-
ability determination.81
Justice Breyer noted that all four of the Daubert factors do not necessarily ap-
ply, even in situations where the reliability of scientific evidence is at issue.82  A
claim may never have been exposed to peer review, because the particular issue
may never have interested anyone.83  It would be a mistake, however, to read
Kumho as saying that the trial court simply may ignore the Daubert factors in
non-science cases.  The Court noted that “a trial court should consider the spe-
cific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the re-
liability of expert testimony.”84  In a concurring opinion, Justices Scalia,
O’Connor, and Thomas added that the discretion enjoyed by the trial court
does not include the discretion to abandon the gatekeeping function or to per-
form it inadequately.85  The justices also said, “[t]hough, as the Court makes
clear today, the Daubert factors are not holy writ, in a particular case the failure
to apply one or another of them may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of
discretion.”86  In effect, a trial court that fails to justify its decision not to use
Daubert factors risks reversal.87
The Kumho opinion included a detailed analysis of the excluded expert tes-
timony.88  Much of this testimony was the engineering equivalent of a differen-
79. Id. at 1436.
80. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999).  Justice Stevens dissented from
this part of the opinion and argued that the case should have been remanded to the Eleventh Circuit to
determine whether the trial judge had abused his discretion.  See id. at 159 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 150-51.
83. See id. at 151.
84. Id. at 152.
85. See id. at 158-59 (Scalia, J., concurring)
86. Id. at 159.
87. See Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1999) (“In the vast majority of
cases, the district court first should decide whether the factors mentioned in Daubert are appropriate.
Once it considers the Daubert factors, the court then can consider whether other factors, not mentioned
in Daubert, are relevant to the case at hand.”); see also Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R.R. Co.,
215 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2000).
88. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 154-56.
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tial diagnosis.  As the Court noted, the issue was not whether it is ever possible
for a tire expert to use visual and tactile inspection methods to determine
whether a tire is defective, but rather, the specific causation question of whether
this tire was defective and whether Carlson’s methods were reliable with respect
to the Carmichaels’ tire.89
Carlson’s theory was that, if the vehicle had been overloaded or the tire un-
der-inflated, it would have led to a phenomenon called “overdeflection.”90
Overdeflection can cause the tire to overheat, which in turn can undo the bond
that holds the tire tread to the carcass.91  Carlson described four indicia of over-
deflection and explained that a tire exhibiting two of the four indicia had been
abused.92  Though he conceded that the tire did exhibit some of these indicia, he
stated that these symptoms were not significant.93  For example, according to
Carlson, one of the symptoms of overdeflection is greater tread wear on the
tire’s shoulder than along the tire’s center.94  Carlson concluded that there was
greater wear on the shoulders of this carcass, but he also concluded that it was
not evenly distributed on both shoulders.95  On this tire, the wear appeared pri-
marily on one shoulder, whereas an overdeflected tire would show equal ab-
normal wear on both.96  Therefore, this wear was not evidence of overdeflec-
tion.97
This reasoning process is not unlike a physician’s differential diagnosis tes-
timony excluding other possible causes of a patient’s illness.  Why was this
analysis not sufficiently reliable to gain admissibility?  Another part of Carl-
son’s testimony provides a partial answer.  He was asked how many miles the
tire had traveled prior to the accident.98  According to the Supreme Court, he
“could not say whether the tire had traveled more than ten, or twenty, or thirty,
or forty, or fifty thousand miles, adding that 6,000 miles was ‘about how far’ he
could ‘say with any certainty.’”99  To this, the Supreme Court responded:
89. See id.
90. Overdeflection “consists of under-inflating the tire or causing it to carry too much weight.”  Id.
at 144.
91. See id.
92. See id. The court summarized his testimony:
These symptoms include (a) tread wear on the tire’s shoulder that is greater than the tread
wear along the tire’s center; (b) signs of a “bead groove,” where the beads have been pushed
too hard against the bead seat on the inside of the tire’s rim; (c) sidewalls of the tire with
physical signs of deterioration, such as discoloration; and/or (d) marks on the tire’s rim
flange. . . . Carlson said that where he does not find at least two of the four physical signs just
mentioned (and presumably where there is no reason to suspect a less common cause of sepa-
ration), he concludes that a manufacturing or design defect caused the separation.
Id. at 144.
93. See id. at 144-45.
94. See id. at 144.
95. See id. at 145.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 154-55.
99. Id. at 155.
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The [trial] court could reasonably have wondered about the reliability of a method of
visual and tactile inspection sufficiently precise to ascertain with some certainty the
abuse-related significance of minute shoulder/center relative tread wear differences,
but insufficiently precise to tell “with any certainty” from the tread wear whether a
tire had traveled less than 10,000 or more than 50,000 miles.  And these concerns
might have been augmented by Carlson’s repeated reliance on the “subjective[ness]”
of his mode of analysis in response to questions seeking specific information regarding
how he could differentiate between a tire that actually had been overdeflected and a
tire that merely looked as though it had been.100
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically tie its analysis to the Dau-
bert factors, the reference to subjectivity suggests that it was questioning the fal-
sifiability and perhaps the error rate of Carlson’s theory.  The Court noted that
Carlson’s overdeflection test—that a tire has not been abused unless it exhibits
two of his four overdeflection indicia—is generally not accepted.101  According
to the Court, the purpose of the relevancy and reliability requirements under
Daubert is “to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon pro-
fessional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same
level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the rele-
vant field.”102  In the eyes of the court, Carlson’s testimony did not meet this
standard.103
If Kumho removed any uncertainty about whether the Daubert factors
might apply to differential diagnosis testimony, it settled little else.  The Kumho
opinion itself is unclear on several points.104  Because both the decision to admit
expert testimony and the criteria used to make an admissibility decision are to
be judged by an abuse of discretion standard on appeal, it is possible we will
witness conflicting trial court admissibility decisions on similar facts.105  This is
all the more likely because, as discussed in the next section, the circuits have
taken varying positions about the admissibility requirements for clinical medical
testimony on causation.  In the next section, we review the criteria used by the
courts in making their judgments.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 157.
102. Id. at 152.  The “same intellectual rigor” standard first appears in a pair of Seventh Circuit
opinions authored by Judge Posner.  See Braun v. Lorillard Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1996); Rosen
v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996).  Post-Kumho appellate opinions have been quick
to adopt this standard.  See, e.g., Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 1999).
103. Indeed, no one has argued that Carlson himself, were he still working for Michelin, would
have concluded in a report to his employer that a similar tire was similarly defective on grounds
identical to those upon which he rested his conclusion here.  Of course, Carlson himself claimed
that his method was accurate, but, as we pointed out in Joiner, “nothing in either Daubert or the
Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected
to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”  522 U.S. at 146.
Kumho, 526 U.S. at 157.
104. For example, will a trial court have abused its discretion if it does not apply the Daubert factors
to the proffered testimony and does not explain why it failed to do so?  The concurring opinion sug-
gests this might be the case, but the Court’s opinion is ambiguous.  If a court does not choose to use the
Daubert factors, it is not clear what other factors might be used in their stead.  See Joseph Sanders,
Kumho and How We Know, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 373 (Spring/Summer 2001).
105. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 136; Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
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IV
THE DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS ADMISSIBILITY OPINIONS
We should begin by noting that there is much common ground with respect
to the admissibility of differential diagnosis testimony.  Courts generally agree
that, at least in toxic tort cases, whenever there are competing causes for the
plaintiff’s injury, an expert must attempt a differential diagnosis before his tes-
timony will be admitted.  For example, in O’Connor v. Commonwealth Edison
Co.,106 the court excluded expert testimony of a physician who claimed he could
determine that the plaintiff’s posterior subcapsular cataract was only caused by
radiation by looking at it.  Moreover, no opinion we know of has concluded that
differential etiology, when properly performed, is inadmissible.107  Here it is use-
ful to follow Professor Paul C. Gianelli and divide the question of scientific va-
lidity into several categories: “(1) the validity of the underlying principle, (2)
the validity of the technique applying the principle, and (3) the proper applica-
tion of the technique on a particular occasion.”108  This formulation is repeated
by Judge Becker in United States v. Downing.109  Courts accept the general va-
lidity of the technique of differential diagnosis.
It is not sufficient, however, for an expert simply to state that she has per-
formed a differential diagnosis.  Much as the Supreme Court did in Kumho,
courts that refuse to admit a differential diagnosis frequently cite the quality of
the expert analysis—the application of the technique in the case at hand—as the
reason for exclusion.  Several pre-Daubert opinions adopted this position.  In
the Agent Orange litigation, Judge Jack Weinstein excluded the testimony of a
physician who determined the cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries on the basis of the
plaintiffs’ signed statements that they had been exposed to Agent Orange and
had the listed symptoms.110  Similarly, in Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co.,111 the
court excluded a physician’s testimony that the defendant had caused plaintiff’s
illness, because the doctor had relied on a medical history that omitted impor-
tant information.112  The Viterbo court concluded:
We do not hold, of course, that admissibility of an expert opinion depends upon the
expert disproving or discrediting every possible cause other than the one espoused by
him.  Here, however, Dr. Johnson has admitted that Viterbo’s symptoms could have
numerous causes and, without support save Viterbo’s oral history, simply picks the
cause that is most advantageous to Viterbo’s claim.  Indeed, Dr. Johnson’s testimony
is no more than Viterbo’s testimony dressed up and sanctified as the opinion of an ex-
106. 807 F. Supp. 1376, 1397 (C.D. Ill. 1992).
107. See, e.g., Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 1999).
108. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half–
Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1980).
109.  United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d. Cir. 1985).
110. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1234-38, 1246-47 (E.D.N.Y. 1985);
see also Ricciardi v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 811 F.2d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 1987) (expert cannot rely on
consulting doctor’s handwritten note when performing a differential diagnosis as to the cause of the
plaintiff’s neurological difficulties following surgery).
111. 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987).
112. See id. at 423.
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pert.  Without more than credentials and a subjective opinion, an expert’s testimony
that “it is so” is not admissible.113
This standard for exclusion has continued among post-Daubert cases.  In In
re Paoli,114 the court affirmed the district court’s exclusion of two experts who
“based their conclusion as to a plaintiff’s symptoms solely on the plaintiff’s self-
report of illness in preparation for litigation.”115  Similar statements can be found
in a number of cases up to the present time.116  For example, in Wooley v. Smith
& Nephew Richards, Inc.,117 the court refused to admit the expert’s opinion that
a pedicle screw implant caused plaintiff’s chronic pain because the expert failed
to interview or examine the patient, or consider all of the patient’s medical rec-
ords.118
When doctors do employ standard diagnostic techniques, many courts are
likely to admit their differential diagnosis testimony.  The classic statement of
this position comes from the Paoli opinion: “To the extent that a doctor utilizes
standard diagnostic techniques in gathering this information, the more likely we
are to find that the doctor’s methodology is reliable.”119  Moreover, most courts
would agree with the Paoli court that a failure to account for all possible causes
does not render expert opinion based on differential diagnosis inadmissible.120
Nevertheless, substantial disagreement still remains on what constitutes a reli-
able differential diagnosis.121  Two dimensions highlight this disagreement: (1)
whether one must “rule in” the putative cause before “ruling out” other causes;
113. Id. at 424.
114. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
115. Id. at 762.
116. See Diaz v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 358, 376 (D.N.J. 1995):
The defendant points to several possible causes of Diaz’s asthma that Dr. Auerbach either
ignores or is unable to satisfactorily discount because he did not have before him all the
necessary information.  While Dr. Auerbach did use standard diagnostic techniques to
measure the extent to which Diaz suffered lung impairment, he did little, if anything, to
“rule out alternative causes.”
Id.; see also Pick v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1151, 1168 (E.D. La. 1997) (“Dr. Campbell may
not render an opinion as to Barry Pick’s specific condition as his diagnosis is not based on sound meth-
odology.  Differential diagnosis presumes that a sufficient and valid clinical investigation has been con-
ducted.”).
117. 67 F. Supp. 2d 703 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
118. See id. at 709.  Wooley is one of many pedicle screw and spinal rod cases.  In the great majority
of published opinions, the expert witness has not been allowed to testify, often because of a failure to
rule out other possible causes of the plaintiff’s injury.  See, e.g., Alexander v. Smith & Nephew, P.L.C.,
90 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (N.D. Okla. 2000); Lawson v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., No. CW. A. 4:96-
CV0297-RWS, 1999 WL 1129677 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 1999); Baker v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc.,
No. CIV.A.1:97-CV-1233-RWS, 1999 WL 1129650 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 1999); Coleman v. Danek Med.,
Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 637 (S.D. Miss. 1999); Wheat v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (N.D. Ga.
1999); Valente v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 48 F. Supp. 2d 862 (E.D. Wis. 1999); Uribe v. Sofamor, S.N.C., No.
8:95CV464, 1999 WL 1129703 (D. Neb. Aug. 16, 1999); Schmerling v. Danek Med., Inc., No. CIV.A.96-
2749, 1999 WL 712591 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1999).  But see Sita v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245,
254 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding expert testimony to be admissible even though report was of dubious re-
liability).
119. In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 758.
120. See id. at 764-65; see also Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 265-66 (4th Cir.
1999); Heller v. Shaw Indus., 167 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir. 1999).
121. See, e.g., Glaser v. Thompson Med. Co., 32 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 1994).
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and (2) whether temporal order alone—that the cause preceded the effect—is
sufficient to support the causal attribution.
A. Ruling in Before Ruling Out
In Cavallo v. Star Enterprise, the trial judge made the following comment:
The process of differential diagnosis is undoubtedly important to the question of “spe-
cific causation.” If other possible causes of an injury cannot be ruled out, or at least
the probability of their contribution to causation minimized, then the “more likely
than not” threshold for proving causation may not be met. But, it is also important to
recognize that a fundamental assumption underlying this method is that the final, sus-
pected “cause” remaining after this process of elimination must actually be capable of
causing the injury. That is, the expert must “rule in” the suspected cause as well as
“rule out” other possible causes.  And, of course, expert opinion on this issue of “gen-
eral causation” must be derived from a scientifically valid methodology.122
The “rule in before ruling out” position of Cavallo presumes that, at least in
toxic tort cases, a differential diagnosis, no matter how well done, can rarely
prove general causation by itself.  The Cavallo position has been repeated in
numerous cases.123  For example, in Raynor v. Merrell Pharmaceuticals, a Ben-
dectin case, the D.C. Circuit compared the present case to its earlier opinion in
Ambrosini v. Labarraque.124  The court there held that “testimony on specific
causation had legitimacy only as follow-up to admissible evidence that the drug
in question could in general cause birth defects.  That first step, establishing a
link between Bendectin and human birth defects (general causation), is missing
here.”125  Similar holdings are to be found in Kelley v. American Heyer-Schulte
Corp.,126 Grimes v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc.,127 Rutigliano v. Valley Business
Forms,128 Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,129 In re Breast Implant Litigation,130
122. Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 771 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 100
F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996).
123. See Raynor v. Merrell Pharms., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also In re Breast
Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1230 (D. Colo. 1998); Kelley v. American Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957
F. Supp. 873, 882 (W.D. Tex. 1997); Rutigliano v. Valley Bus. Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 783 (D.N.J.
1996); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1413 (D. Or. 1996).
124. 101 F.3d 129, 138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
125. Raynor, 104 F.3d at 1376.
126. 957 F. Supp. at 882:
While epidemiological evidence is not a necessary element in every toxic tort case, it is cer-
tainly a very important element, especially when there is no evidence of the biological
mechanism which links the product to the complained-of condition.  In the absence of any
evidence regarding general causation, the Court will not permit Dr. Espinoza to testify as
to specific causation.
127. 907 F. Supp. 33, 38 (D.N.H. 1995):
In summary, even if I were to assume that Dr. Lerman’s experiment is methodologically
sound, I must still exclude his opinion on general causation because the final essential step
in the formulation of that opinion is based on an untested assumption which fails Dau-
bert’s reliability and fit requirements.  Since his opinion on specific causation is necessarily
based on his opinion concerning general causation, that testimony must be excluded as
well.
128. 929 F. Supp. at 783.
129. 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1413 (D. Or. 1996) (holding that “[t]estimony regarding specific causation in
a given patient is irrelevant unless general causation is established”).
130. 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1230 (D. Colo 1998) (citation omitted):
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National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc.,131 and Wynacht
v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.132
The “rule in” requirement sometimes is presented as a question of dosage.
Assuming that some dose of the substance at issue might cause harm, the ques-
tion becomes:  Does the expert have adequate grounds for asserting that the
dosage to which the plaintiff was exposed could cause anyone harm?  The re-
cent case of  Mancuso v. Consolidated Edison explained that
[a] fundamental tenet of toxicology is that the “dose makes the poison” and that all
chemical agents, including water, are harmful if consumed in large quantities, while
even the most toxic substances are harmless in minute quantities . . . .  Therefore, in
determining whether plaintiffs’ exposure to PCBs could have caused any illnesses that
they have, it is necessary to establish the dose/response relationship between PCBs
and those particular illnesses.133
The Mancuso court rejected the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert who was
prepared to testify that exposure to PCB caused a variety of injuries.134  The
court concluded that the plaintiff’s expert “totally ignored the methodology
prescribed by both the World Health Organization (WHO) and the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) for determining whether a person has been ad-
versely affected by a toxin.”135  As the court noted later in the opinion, there is a
three step procedure to the methodology:
First, the level of exposure of plaintiff to the toxin in question must be determined;
second, from a review of the scientific literature, it must be established that the toxin is
capable of producing plaintiff’s illness—called “general causation”—and the
dose/response relationship between the toxin and the illness—that is, the level of ex-
posure which will produce such an illness—must be ascertained; and third, “specific
causation” must be established by demonstrating the probability that the toxin caused
The process of differential diagnosis is undoubtedly important to the question of “specific
causation.”  If other possible causes of an injury cannot be ruled out, or at least the prob-
ability of their contribution to causation minimized, then the “more likely than not”
threshold for proving causation may not be met.  But, it is also important to recognize that
a fundamental assumption underlying this method is that the final, suspected “cause” re-
maining after this process of elimination must actually be capable of causing the injury.
That is, the expert must “rule in” the suspected cause as well as “rule out” other possible
causes.  And, of course, expert opinion on this issue of “general causation” must be de-
rived from a scientifically valid methodology.
131. 22 F. Supp. 2d 942, 963 (E.D. Ark. 1998), aff’d, 191 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 1999).
132. 113 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1209 (E.D. Tenn. 2000):
There is a fundamental distinction between Dr. Ziem’s ability to render a medical diagno-
sis based on clinical experience and her ability to render an opinion on causation of Wy-
nacht’s injuries.  Beckman apparently does not dispute, and the Court does not question,
that Dr. Ziem is an experienced physician, qualified to diagnose medical conditions and
treat patients.  The ability to diagnose medical conditions is not remotely the same, how-
ever, as the ability to deduce, delineate, and describe, in a scientifically reliable manner,
the causes of these medical conditions.
133. Mancuso v. Consolidated Edison Co., 56 F. Supp. 2d 391, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), rev’d on other
grounds, 216 F.3d 1072 (2d Cir. 2000).  Mancuso’s expert apparently found that the concentration of
PCBs at the plaintiff’s marina was four parts in ten billion, less than one ten-thousandths as high as the
level which the EPA has found to be safe.  See id. at 404.
134. See id. at 411.
135. Id.; see also 56 F. Supp. 2d at 394-95.
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this particular plaintiff’s illness, which involves weighing the possibility of other causes
of the illness—a so-called “differential diagnosis.”136
Other courts have taken similar positions.137
Contrary to these holdings, several courts appear either to reject the re-
quirement that one must first rule in before ruling out or to reject the require-
ment that plaintiff’s experts cite clear evidence that the substance in question
can cause injuries at the dose levels experienced by the plaintiff.  For example,
in a case decided not long after Daubert, physicians were permitted to testify
that Hot Stuff “anabolic activator” caused diverticulosis and diverticulitis,
based primarily on differential diagnosis, despite the fact that “there is no peer
reviewed documentation that any of the ingredients in Hot Stuff, individually or
in combination, causes diverticulosis, diverticulitis or diverticulum perfora-
tion.”138  If other evidence proving general causation is a prerequisite for differ-
ential diagnosis testimony, the appellate court in Kannankeril v. Terminix Inter-
national, Inc. erred when it reversed a district court decision to exclude the
testimony of the plaintiff’s only expert and enter a summary judgment for the
defendant.139  The plaintiff’s expert concluded that her injuries were caused by
Dursban, even though the evidence on dosage was quite limited.140  In addition,
the expert performed no clinical tests to support his causal opinion, and the
only blood test conducted on the plaintiff was negative for Dursban.141  In West-
berry v. Gislaved Gummi, the plaintiff’s expert testified that his exposure to air-
borne talc in the workplace caused the aggravation of his pre-existing sinus
condition.142  The appellate court affirmed the admission of this testimony by the
trial court following a jury verdict for the plaintiff even though the expert “had
no scientific literature on which to rely to ‘rule in’ talc as a possible basis for
Westberry’s sinus condition.”143  In support of its position, the court noted that
the plaintiff himself had testified to very high levels of talc in the workplace,
and the Material Safety Data Sheet for talc provided that inhalation in high
concentrations irritates mucous membranes.144  Finally, in Heller v. Shaw Indus-
tries, the plaintiff claimed that her respiratory illnesses were caused by volatile
organic compounds emitted from new carpet installed in her home.145  Judge
136. Id. at 399.
137. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 1999); Moore v. Ashland Chem.
Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 1998); Savage v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1033-34
(E.D. Ark. 1999); Cuevas v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 956 F. Supp. 1306, 1312 (S.D. Miss. 1997);
Cartwright v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 900, 904 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
138. Becker v. National Health Prods., Inc., 896 F. Supp. 100, 102 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); see also McCul-
lock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming admission of treating doctor’s tes-
timony despite the fact that he “could not point to a single piece of medical literature that says glue
fumes cause throat polyps”).
139. See Kannankeril v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802 (3d Cir. 1997).
140. See id. at 808.
141. See id. at 805
142. See Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1999).
143. Id. at 264.
144. See id.
145. See Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999).
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Becker specifically rejected the requirement that plaintiff’s expert always cite
published studies on general causation reliably to conclude that a particular
object caused a particular illness.146  In Heller, the court seems to have assumed
there was no research on the general causation question.
B. Temporal Order
The question of general causation aside, there remains the difficult question
of what differential diagnosis evidence the expert must present to make an ad-
missible argument on specific causation.  Disagreements on this question are
most evident in cases that discuss whether the temporal order of events alone—
the injury followed the exposure—is sufficient to rule out other possible
causes.147  Most cases that have discussed the issue have stated that temporal or-
der alone is insufficient to support an expert’s opinion that substance X caused
injury Y.148  Statements to this effect may be found in a number of swine flu
cases from the early 1980s.149  Post-Daubert opinions that apply the Daubert fac-
tors frequently take the position that determinations of causation based solely
146. See id. at 155.  However, the appellate court concluded that exclusion of the expert’s testimony
was not an abuse of discretion because the evidence did not support the doctor’s reliance on the tempo-
ral relationship between the onset of the plaintiff’s illness and the carpet installation nor his estimate of
the levels of volatile organic compounds emitted by the carpet.  See id. at 164.
147. Temporal order is one consideration in determining whether a relationship is causal.  Re-
searchers have developed a number of criteria that may be used in making this assessment.  One of the
best known is a set of criteria originally developed by Sir Austin Bradford Hill:
(1) Is the temporal relationship correct? Does the “effect” follow the “cause”?
(2) Is there evidence from true experiments in humans?
(3) Is the association a strong one?
(4) Is the association consistent from study to study?
(5) Is there a dose-response gradient?
(6) Is the association specific?
(7) Does the association make biological sense?
(8) Is there an appropriate analogy to other known causal relationships?
See ANDREW C. HARPER AND LAURIE J. LAMBERT, THE HEALTH OF POPULATIONS: AN
INTRODUCTION 75-79 (1994).
148. This is not to say that temporal order is irrelevant to a causal analysis.  See, e.g., Unthank v.
United States (In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig.), 533 F. Supp. 703, 714 (D. Utah 1982):
The close temporal relation between the vaccination and onset of neurologic symptoms
convinces us that the vaccine was in fact the proximate cause of those symptoms.  The
thirty-day interval between plaintiff’s vaccination and the onset of her symptoms falls well
within the ten week period in which the government concedes the vaccine may cause
Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS).
See also Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that exclusion of the expert’s
testimony was not an abuse of discretion because the evidence did not support the doctor’s reliance on
a temporal relationship between the onset of the plaintiff’s illness and the carpet installation nor his
estimate of the levels of volatile organic compounds emitted by the carpet).
149. See, e.g., Hasler v. United States, 718 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1983) (“Without more, [a] proxi-
mate temporal relationship will not support a finding of causation.”) (reversing district court’s finding
that swine flu inoculation caused plaintiff’s injuries becase of a close temporal connection); Bean v.
United States (In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig.), 533 F. Supp. 567, 581 (D. Colo. 1980)
(holding that a mere temporal relation is insufficient to establish causation between swine flu vaccine
and drop foot).
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on temporal order should be excluded for lack of reliability.150  The following
passage is typical of the reason given for exclusion:
Dr. Winters (and Dr. Shalat) propound the argument that because [acute lymphocytic
leukemia (“ALL”)] is extremely rare in adult males, and because Gary Whiting was
exposed to radiation before he contracted ALL, his ALL must have been caused by
radiation exposure.  This is a classic illustration of the logical fallacy post hoc ergo
propter hoc.  It ignores the fact that ALL can occur (and most often does) in adult
males who have no history of occupational exposure to radiation, as well as the fact
that adult males who are exposed to radiation at levels similar to Gary Whiting’s have
no higher incidence of ALL than do unexposed adult males.151
150. See, e.g., Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 804 F. Supp. 972, 1023 (S.D. Ohio 1992), aff’d, 24 F.3d
809 (6th Cir. 1994) (excluding expert testimony based solely on a temporal relationship between the
exposure to insecticide and the injury, where there was no medical evidence of causation); Porter v.
Whitehall Labs., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 611 (7th Cir. 1993) (excluding expert testimony of two doctors where
their opinions were based solely on the temporal relationship between the ingestion of ibuprofen and
the injury).
151. Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 23 n.52 (D. Mass. 1995).  Further examples:
Dr. Schonfeld admits that he lacks knowledge of the nature and structure of these herbicides,
and acknowledges that his RADS diagnosis is based on the temporal congruity between Mr.
Schmaltz’s alleged exposure and the onset of his symptoms.  It is well settled that a causation
opinion based solely on a temporal relationship is not derived from the scientific method and
is therefore insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Schmaltz v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
[T]he witness admits that if the Plaintiff did not have breast implants but had the exact same
symptoms and blood chemistry, then his diagnosis would have been non-implant-caused Sjo-
gren’s Syndrome.  Essentially, this is a bit like saying that if a person has a scratchy throat,
runny nose, and a nasty cough, that person has a cold; if, on the other-hand, that person has a
scratchy throat, runny nose, nasty cough, and wears a watch, they have a watch-induced cold.
Kelley v. American Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873, 882 (W.D. Tex. 1997).
Dr. Johnson also summarily ruled out idiopathic [anterior ischemic optic neuropathy] despite
noting that Nelson had classical risk factors for idiopathic AION: hypertension, diabetes mel-
litus, and a small optic nerve cup-disc ratio.  The only reason he gave for this differential de-
termination was the temporal proximity between Nelson’s Amiodarone therapy and the onset
of his optic neuropathy.  This type of post hoc propter hoc reasoning is the exact type of “sci-
entific analysis” of which courts must be aware.
Nelson v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 92 F. Supp.2d 954, 971 (W.D. Mo. 2000); see also Valente v. Sofa-
mor, S.N.C., 48 F. Supp. 2d 862, 872 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (“Instead, Dr. Trobiani’s [sic] simply assumes that
if A occurred before B, then A must have caused B.  Such reasoning cannot qualify as expert testi-
mony.”); Willert v. Ortho Pharms. Corp., 995 F. Supp. 979, 982 (D. Minn. 1998) (“Ultimately, the the-
ory devolves into the thesis that because ‘B’ came after ‘A,’ ‘A’ caused ‘B.’ While this may be phe-
nomenologically and temporally accurate, it does not prove causation . . . .”); In re Breast Implant
Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1232 (D. Colo. 1998) (“A temporal relationship by itself provides no evi-
dence of causation . . . . Even as to specific causation, temporality cannot withstand Daubert scrutiny.”);
Cuevas v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 956 F. Supp. 1306, 1312 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (“Dr. Parent ac-
knowledges that his opinion is based on the temporal relationship between the alleged exposure and
Mr. Cuevas’ medical problems . . . . The Court agrees that this methodology is simply not sufficient to
amount to reliable scientific knowledge and fails under Daubert.”); Cartwright v. Home Depot U.S.A.,
Inc., 936 F. Supp. 900, 906 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (“Review of the entirety of Dr. McKay’s reports, affidavits,
deposition testimony and supporting literature fails to identify what ‘methodology’ he did employ,
other than reliance on the sequence of events.”); Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 773 (E.D. Va.
1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996):
[A]t bottom, [the expert’s] opinion is founded primarily on the temporal connection be-
tween the spill and the development of Ms. Cavallo’s symptoms, as well as on his subjec-
tive, unverified, belief that AvJet can cause the types of injuries from which Ms. Cavallo
suffers.  This is not the method of science.
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As is the case with ruling in before ruling out, however, a number of courts
have permitted experts to testify as to specific causation based on little more
than temporal order.  Not surprisingly, perhaps, many of these cases are the
same ones adopting the minority position on ruling in before ruling out.  For
example, in Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB,152 in addition to objecting that
the expert failed to rule in talc before ruling out other causes, the defendant
also objected that the expert’s causal analysis rested almost entirely on the tem-
poral order of events.  The court replied that “depending on the circumstances,
a temporal relationship between exposure to a substance and the onset of a dis-
ease or a worsening of symptoms can provide compelling evidence of causa-
tion.”153  The court found the temporal evidence here compelling partly because
the plaintiff’s sinus condition improved when he stayed home from work.154
A similar outcome occurred in the facts of Kannankeril v. Terminix Interna-
tional, Inc.155  In this case, homeowners sued a pest exterminator for a wide-
ranging set of cognitive impairment injuries to Dr. Mary Kannankeril from ap-
plication of the pesticide Dursban at their residence.156  Dr. Kannankeril’s symp-
toms began approximately one year after the beginning of the Terminix service.
After an application that produced objectionable odors, the defendant sent a
company to clean the residence.  Nine months later, the plaintiffs asked the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection to test their home.157  An
analysis of air samples taken at that time failed to find detectable levels of pesti-
cides.158  Apparently, Dr. Kannankeril’s symptoms did not abate after the pesti-
cide applications ceased.159  The plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Benjamin Gerson, testi-
fied that  “[t]he temporal relationship and the nature of her complaints lead me
to conclude that with reasonable medical certainty, the cause of Dr. Kan-
nankeril’s Central Nervous System manifestations of toxicity is exposure to
Dursban in [sic] 1989 to 1990.”160  The trial judge had excluded this expert’s tes-
timony and granted summary judgment for the defendant.161  The Third Circuit
152. 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999).
153. Id. at 265.
154. See id.  Neither the court nor the expert appears to distinguish between the cause of an injury
and the aggravation of a previous injury.  The point appears to be relevant because earlier in the opin-
ion, the court states that Westberry brought the present action claiming that his “breathing airborne
talc proximately caused the aggravation of his pre-existing sinus condition.” Id. at 260.
155. 128 F.3d 802 (3d Cir. 1997).
156. See id. at 805.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Id.  According to the Third Circuit, Dr. Gerson based his opinion on the plaintiff’s account of
her symptoms, a report prepared by a neuropsychologist who examined Dr. Kannankeril, a summary
report of the times and amounts of pesticide applications to the Kannankeril home, and his general ex-
perience and readings, general medical knowledge, standard textbooks, and standard references.  See
id. at 806.  The report by the neuropsychologist, Dr. Grober, included the results of a cholinesterase
blood test, which is the most accepted test for determining exposure to Dursban.  The test did not pro-
duce abnormal results.  See id. at 807.
161. Kannankeril v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 804 (3d Cir. 1997).
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vacated and remanded.162  Dr. Gerson did not rule out other possible causes of
the plaintiff’s illness, but the court noted that the defendant had not pointed to
any other plausible cause.  Although the court noted that the defendant is not
obligated to offer alternative theories of causation, its failure to do so seemingly
relieved the expert from offering his own.163  Temporal order seems to have
been the primary basis of the expert’s opinion.
In Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc., refinery workers brought an action against
the defendants for health problems caused by exposure to excessive amounts of
benzene.164  There appeared to be little doubt that exposure to benzene at levels
present in the plant could cause injuries similar to those suffered by the plain-
tiffs.165  In addition to this general causation evidence, the plaintiffs’ expert
pointed to the strong temporal connection between the workers’ exposure to
benzene and the onset of their symptoms.166  However, he did not undertake a
differential diagnosis.167  For this reason, the trial judge refused to admit his tes-
timony.168  The Fifth Circuit reversed on this point.169  On the question of specific
causation the court said that
Dr. Stevens pointed to the strong temporal connection between the refinery workers’
exposure to benzene and the onset of their symptoms.  The refinery workers devel-
oped their symptoms contemporaneously with the first attempts to process HAD, and
their symptoms subsided within two weeks after they left the refinery.  A temporal
connection standing alone is entitled to little weight in determining causation.  How-
ever, a temporal connection is entitled to greater weight when there is an established
scientific connection between exposure and illness or other circumstantial evidence
supporting the causal link.  In the present case, both scientific literature and strong
circumstantial evidence support the causal connection.170
Recently, in Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson & Co., the Seventh Circuit reversed
the trial court judge’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s experts who were prepared to
testify that the plaintiff’s fall at a construction site caused his chronic pain syn-
drome (“CPS”).171  The trial judge had refused to admit the testimony because
he concluded that the experts had no scientific basis for their testimony.  Each
physician had relied on the plaintiff’s statements about his past medical history
as the basis for the diagnosis that the fall caused his CPS.172  Dr. Richardson, one
of the experts, said that, based on Mr. Cooper’s statement that he had been
without pain before the fall, the pain was caused by the fall.173  He also explained
that the cause of Mr. Cooper’s trauma was irrelevant to him in prescribing a
162. 128 F.3d at 805.
163. See id. at 808 n.7.
164. 174 F.3d. 661 (5th Cir. 1999).
165. See id. at 669.
166. See id. at 670.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 670-71.
169. See id. at 661.
170. Id. at 670.
171. 211 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 2000).
172. See id. at 1019.
173. See id. at 1012.
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course of treatment and that, therefore, he did not inquire further as to the
cause of Mr. Cooper’s CPS.174  On cross examination, the defendant elicited tes-
timony that Dr. Richardson had really not investigated into the cause of the
plaintiff’s pain.175  Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant’s
argument, that the expert’s post hoc ergo propter hoc determination of causa-
tion was not an acceptable methodology in cases where the mechanism of injury
is not understood, went to the weight of the medical testimony, not its admissi-
bility.176
V
UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES
How might we understand this set of admissibility opinions?  In this final
section, we note three factors that seem to affect the outcome in these cases: the
commitment to jury decisionmaking, the quality of the available causal informa-
tion, and the type of reasoning employed by the expert.
A. Commitment to Jury Decisionmaking
The different results in these cases are partly attributable to a non-causal
consideration: a commitment to jury decisionmaking.  In the face of increasing
trial complexity and the growth of  scientific testimony, many courts have been
more willing to take steps that erode traditional adversary processes and adopt
a more inquisitorial style of adjudication.177  With respect to the admissibility of
expert testimony, this has meant that judges have been more willing to limit
party control of the evidence that reaches the jury.178  Almost everyone agrees
that the admissibility threshold under Daubert is higher than it was under Frye,
even though when it was decided, the Supreme Court implied that the Daubert
criteria were more in tune with the liberal admissibility thrust of the Federal
Rules.179  Daubert’s higher threshold reflects this trend.  Not every court, how-
ever, is equally committed to a less adversarial style.  The Third and Fourth
Circuits have been more solicitous toward jury decisionmaking and adversarial
174. See id. at 1019.  This passage highlights the difference between differential diagnosis and differ-
ential etiology.  Dr. Richardson’s statement makes clear the fact that he was primarily concerned with a
differential diagnosis, that is, chronic musculoskeletal pain.  He was much less interested in differential
etiology, or the cause of the pain.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 1020-21.
177. See Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983
(1999); Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of Adversarial Pro-
cesses, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 355 (1998).
178. A number of recent law review articles have discussed this shift in the balance between judge
and jury.  See Harvey Brown, Procedural Issues Under Daubert, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1133 (1999);
Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using Their Evidentiary
Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335 (1999); Richard Collin Man-
grum, Kumho Tire Company: The Expansion of the Court’s Role in Screening Every Aspect of Every
Expert’s Testimony at Every Stage of the Proceedings, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 525 (2000).
179. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993).
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processes than other circuits, notably the Fifth.  This non-causal consideration
undoubtedly plays some role in explaining the differences we observe regarding
differential diagnosis admissibility decisions.
B. Quality of the Available Causal Information
Some of the differences in the admissibility opinions may be understood as a
function of the underlying quality of the available causal information.  The
opinions that require the expert to “rule in before ruling out” are, in our view,
correct.  However, some of the courts that appear to have retreated from this
requirement have addressed fact patterns where there was some evidence of
general causation.  This is most clear in cases like Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi
AB, where the issue was one of dosage as much as whether even very heavy
concentrations of talc could cause injury.180
Other cases appear to relax the plaintiff’s burden on this issue when the
court believes that there is little or no information on whether a substance
causes injury.  Thus in Heller v. Shaw Industrial, Inc., Judge Becker did not say
that the plaintiff need not rule in the alleged cause, but only that the expert is
not required to cite published studies addressing general causation.181  In this re-
gard, Judge Calabresi’s opinion in Zuchowicz v. United States is instructive.182  In
Zuchowicz, the plaintiff’s wife died from a fatal lung condition allegedly caused
by the drug Danocrine.183  Mrs. Zuchowicz was negligently prescribed an over-
dose of the drug, which she took daily for over a month.184  She continued taking
180. 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999).
181. See 167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999).  Judge Becker distinguishes the facts in Heller from both
more and less extreme cases:
The temporal relationship will often be (only) one factor, and how much weight it provides for
the overall determination of whether an expert has “good grounds” for his or her conclusion
will differ depending on the strength of that relationship.  For example, if there was a minor
oil spill on the Hudson River on the same day that Heller began experiencing her symptoms in
West Chester, Pennsylvania, and she recovered around the time the oil was cleaned up, a
proper differential diagnosis and temporal analysis by a well-qualified physician such as Dr.
Papano could not possibly lead to the conclusion that the oil spill caused Heller’s illness.
Conversely, “if a person were doused with chemical X and immediately thereafter developed
symptom Y, the need for published literature showing a correlation between the two may be
lessened.”
The present case falls between these two hypotheticals.  In this middle area, we do not believe
that Daubert and Paoli require a physician to rely on definitive published studies before con-
cluding that exposure to a particular object or chemical was the most likely cause of a plain-
tiff’s illness.
Id.  at 154 (citations omitted).
Unfortunately, Judge Becker leaves us with the suggestion that what distinguishes these two cases is
the strength of the temporal order.  This alone, however, cannot be the determining factor.  The tempo-
ral relationship between exposure and illness might be identical in the two hypotheticals, but we pre-
sume Judge Becker would exclude the testimony in the Hudson River spill case.  What is missing in
both cases is a lack of proof of general causation.  If Judge Becker were to be told that the chemical X
with which the plaintiff was doused in the second situation was an incredibly weak solution, presumably
temporal order alone would not suffice.
182. See 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998).
183. See id. at 383.
184. See id. at 384.
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the correct dosage of the medication for another two months, when she was ad-
vised to cease due to adverse symptoms.185  Because of the rareness of primary
pulmonary hypertension and the lack of any formal research on the effects of
Danocrine at the higher dosage, the experts could not point to specific research
supporting their differential diagnosis that the drug caused the decedent’s ill-
ness.186  They could, however, point to studies identifying other agents, such as
birth control pills, some appetite suppressants, and chemotherapy drugs, that
cause this illness.187  Affirming the trial court’s decision to admit the testimony,
Judge Calabresi noted that the experts were able to provide a biologically plau-
sible reason why the drug could cause this effect.188
In many situations it would be an insurmountable burden for the plaintiff to
present substantial epidemiological or animal study data indicating adverse
health effects from a given dose of a substance.  In both Heller and Zuchowicz,
the court implicitly recognized this fact and allowed the plaintiff to proceed with
relatively less evidence than would be required if there were a substantial body
of research.  In this respect, these decisions conform to Gerald Boston’s obser-
vation that courts have frequently relaxed the plaintiff’s obligation to produce
hard science on general causation for injuries that may be placed in the “spo-
radic accident model” of tort law.189  In these cases, where only a single plaintiff
or a few plaintiffs have allegedly suffered an injury due to exposure, a medical
doctor will be permitted to render an opinion on general causation with little or
no epidemiological evidence and sometimes with very little toxicological evi-
dence.190  Examples of such cases include specific medical treatments, as in
Zuchowicz, and  nonrecurring occupational diseases that affect a limited num-
ber of individuals, as in Heller.191  However, courts have not been willing to go
beyond this and adopt the proposals of some commentators who argue that, in
situations of irreducible causal uncertainty, the plaintiff should either be re-
lieved of the burden of persuasion on the causal question or should be permit-
ted some percentage recovery, as long as the plaintiff could establish strong un-
185. See id.
186. See id. at 385.
187. See id. at 385-86.
188. See id. at 387.
189. Gerald W. Boston, A Mass–Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of Scientific
Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181, 188 (1993); see also Michael D.
Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of
Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 643, 680-82 (1992).
190. See Lakie v. Smithkline Beecham, 965 F. Supp. 49, 56 (D.D.C. 1997) (alleging that benzene in
denture adhesive caused rare form of leukemia) (“The absence of epidemiological studies, however,
while important, is not dispositive as long as the methodology employed by the expert is sound . . . .
This is especially true when the disease is an extremely rare disorder like MDS 5 q-minus.”).
191. See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038 (2d Cir. 1995) (glue fumes allegedly caus-
ing throat polyps); Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., No. 91-15597, 1992 WL 217803 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 1992)
(collagen allegedly causing systemic immunological injuries); Becker v. National Health Prods., Inc.,
896 F. Supp. 100 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (alleging that Hot Stuff “anabolic activator” caused diverticulosis and
diverticulitis).
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certainty about causation.192  Here, as in other areas of causal uncertainty, we
are left with the question of how far the courts should go in easing the plaintiff’s
burden of proof.  Even under a relaxed standard, it is difficult to square the
opinions in Becker v. National Health Products193 and Kannankeril v. Terminix
International, Inc.194 with the requirement that the plaintiff must rule in the al-
leged cause before ruling out other potential causes.
Assuming that the general causation “rule in” hurdle is surmounted, there
remains the specific causation question of when a differential diagnosis is ade-
quate.  Once again, some differences in language can be explained by the facts
presented in the case.  A case in point is Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc.195  In that
case, multiple defendants simultaneously developed similar health problems af-
ter occupational exposure to levels of benzene known to be capable of produc-
ing these types of injuries.196  The very existence of multiple co-worker defen-
dants tends to rule out other causes not job-related.  Moreover, the injuries
were contemporaneous with the introduction of benzene into the workplace
and abated within two weeks after the defendants left the refinery.197  The infer-
ence to be drawn from “mere” temporal order was much stronger here than in
most situations and was closer to the classic slip-and-fall scenario where tempo-
ral order alone frequently suffices.198
  Black v. Food Lion, Inc., an actual slip-and-fall case, ironically presents a
fact pattern at the other end of the spectrum.199  Black slipped on spilled mayon-
naise in the defendant’s store.200  She immediately complained of lower back and
arm pain, a headache, and dizziness.201  She underwent numerous tests for sev-
eral months, but her treating physician could not identify a physical basis for the
plaintiff’s continued complaints of pain.202  She was referred to another physi-
cian specializing in treating patients with persistent pain.203  After several weeks
of treatment, this physician, Dr. Reyna, diagnosed the plaintiff with a condition
known as fibromyalgia syndrome.204  According to the Fifth Circuit, “Dr. Reyna
192. See Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1,
45 (1995).
193. 896 F. Supp. 100 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
194. 128 F.3d. 802 (3d Cir. 1997).
195. 174 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1999).
196. See id. at 664.
197. See id. at 670.
198. An example of the classic slip-and-fall scenario would be where a grocery store patron slips on
a banana peel and breaks his leg.  Proof that the leg was not broken before the fall settles the causal
question.  Insofar as Westberry is a case about talc aggravating rather than causing the plaintiff’s sinus
condition, perhaps a similar argument may be made in that case as well.
199. 171 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1999).
200. See id. at 309.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.  Fibromyalgia is characterized by complaints of generalized pain, poor sleep, an inability
to concentrate, and chronic fatigue.  The condition is most common among women between 30 and 50
and is often associated with hormonal problems.
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hypothesized that the fall at Food Lion caused physical trauma to Black, which
caused ‘hormonal changes,’ which caused Black’s fibromyalgia.”205  The case was
removed to a federal court and tried before a magistrate who, over defense ob-
jections, permitted Dr. Reyna to testify and awarded a judgment to the plaintiff
based on the testimony.206
In reversing the fibromyalgia damages, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the
utility of the differential diagnosis process but noted that, under Daubert,
Kumho, and Moore, it must be applied fact-specifically in each case.207  With re-
spect to this fact-specific differential diagnosis, the Fifth Circuit made the fol-
lowing observation:
[The magistrate judge] then found that Dr. Reyna followed [an appropriate] protocol
by (a) taking a medical history from Black, (b) ruling out prior or subsequent “causes”
of fibromyalgia, (c) performing or reviewing physical tests [which all turned up nega-
tive], and (d) deducing that the Food Lion fall was the only possible remaining cause
of fibromyalgia that appeared nine months later.
This analysis amounts to saying that because Dr. Reyna thought she had eliminated
other possible causes of fibromyalgia, even though she does not know the real
“cause,” it had to be the fall at Food Lion.
In this case, neither Dr. Reyna nor medical science knows the exact process that re-
sults in fibromyalgia or the factors that trigger the process.  Absent these critical scien-
tific predicates, for which there is no proof in the record, no scientifically reliable con-
clusion on causation can be drawn.  Dr. Reyna’s use of a general methodology cannot
vindicate a conclusion for which there is no underlying medical support.208
Although the expert purported to perform most of the steps required of a
differential diagnosis, the Fifth Circuit found that her analysis only loosely
linked some generalities.209  Although falls may cause fibromyalgia, it is not clear
that they are a typical or frequent cause.210  This becomes particularly important
when, as in this case, one cannot assume that most causes of any given ailment
are known.  Otherwise, as Susan R. Poulter has noted,211 the elimination of other
risk factors would not significantly increase the likelihood that the exposure was
the cause of the plaintiff’s injury.212  In such situations, one cannot make a
205. Id.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 314.
208. Id. at 313-14.
209. “If the magistrate judge thought he was applying Daubert, however, he fatally erred by apply-
ing its criteria at a standard of meaninglessly high generality rather than boring in on the precise state
of scientific knowledge in this case.” Id. at 314.
210. See id. at 313.
211. See Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is there a Rational Solution to the Problem of
Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 233 (1993).
212. A similar point is made by Judge Boggs in his dissent in Glaser v. Thompson Medical Co., Inc.,
32 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 1994) (reversing a district court decision granting defendant summary judgment):
The fallacy of the court’s conclusion may be underscored by the implication that follows.
Every day, many Americans faint and fall.  By Dr. Zaloga’s analysis, every one of them can
get to a jury if they happen to have taken any of the 125-plus over-the-counter common-cold
remedies or diet aids that provide doses of 75 mg of PPA . . . and have no other strong organic
reason for a faint . . . . In short, all that we have is a witness’s personal belief that an environ-
mental condition to which tens of millions are exposed annually is capable of wreaking ran-
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Sherlock Holmes-like deduction that simply because all other known causes
have been eliminated, the only known cause left, no matter how improbable,
must be the actual cause.  From this perspective, the outcome in Cooper v. Carl
A. Nelson & Co.213 is more difficult to justify.  Perhaps it should instead be un-
derstood as an opinion reflecting a stronger commitment to jury decision-
making.
C. Style of Reasoning Adopted by the Expert
A court’s decision whether or not to admit an expert’s testimony may be af-
fected by the style of reasoning employed by the expert.  The district court in
Sanderson v. International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc., explicitly states a point
that is often implicit in other opinions.214  The plaintiff argued that
the Court should adopt a “common-sense,” lay interpretation of causation.  She con-
tends that because her injuries are of the type caused by defendants’ products, she was
exposed to same, and there is a temporal connection between such exposures and her
experience of symptoms, a jury could find that defendants’ products caused her inju-
ries.215
The court rejected this argument.216  In a case requiring expert testimony on
causation, neither the plaintiff nor the plaintiff’s experts may rely exclusively on
the common-sense causal conclusion that arises from temporal order.217  Sander-
son’s expert
could not identify anything other than pure temporal coincidence to support his prob-
ability estimate, and based it upon what he knows about people with similar health
problems, “not necessarily with fragrances but from other chemicals.” He also admit-
ted that there are no published statistics that would allow him to calculate or quantify
the relative risk of any of the plaintiff’s injuries.218
The court concluded that this was not a “scientific connection” and that the ex-
pert’s testimony did not meet the Daubert standard.219
What, from the court’s perspective, is wrong with “common sense” in this
context?  The answer, it seems, is that the approach is not “scientific.”  In
Sanderson, as in other cases discussed above, the court criticized experts for
dom havoc.  This belief is not supported by the scientific studies he refers to . . . . This is post
hoc propter hoc reasoning at its rankest, and is contrary to the  “hard look” encouraged and
even required by our case law.
Id. at 982.
213. 211 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that fact that medical experts relied on worker’s state-
ment about his past medical history as basis for diagnosis that his fall caused chronic pain syndrome did
not render such expert testimony unreliable).
214. 950 F. Supp. 981 (C.D. Cal. 1996).  Sanderson claimed that exposure to the defendants’ fra-
grance products caused her toxic encelopathy, chronic nasal problems, and small airways disease.  See
id. at 988.
215. Id. at 985.
216. See id. at 985-86.
217. The court cites Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1987), for the point
that an expert’s testimony that merely repeats a layperson’s oral history “is no more than [lay] testi-
mony dressed up and sanctified as the opinion of an expert.”  Sanderson, 950 F. Supp. at 987 n.4.
218. See Sanderson, 950 F. Supp. at 999-1000.
219. See id.
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failing to take a “scientific approach.”  There is, of course, no bright-line test for
distinguishing between scientific and non-scientific opinions.  However, dual-
process theory in social psychology offers some insights as to what the courts
have in mind.  This body of research argues that individuals have two systems
for processing information.220  Experiential processing is more holistic, tends to
be outcome-oriented, and tends to represent events as concrete exemplars.221
Rational processing, on the other hand, is more analytic, relies more on abstract
symbols, and is process-oriented.222  By and large, science is more committed to
rational, rather than experiential, processing of information.223  When courts
object that an approach is insufficiently scientific, they often seem to be sug-
gesting that it is insufficiently rational in this sense.  Judges find less acceptable
those expert judgments relying primarily on the expert’s intuition224 and profes-
sional judgment,225—judgments that reflect a greater degree of experiential
processing.226
Here we see the impact of Daubert, Kumho, and more than a decade of
post-Frye jurisprudence.  At bottom, the Daubert revolution is about the rela-
tionship between law and science.  Frye asked judges to acquiesce in the judg-
ment of the relevant scientific community.  It invited judges to accept an ex-
pert’s judgment as long as it appeared to be within the mainstream of scientific
opinion.227  Daubert, on the other hand, invites the trial court to make an inde-
pendent inquiry.228  The judge should determine whether the proffered evidence
is reliable by examining the reasoning and methodology underlying the expert’s
testimony.229 As Michael J. Saks recently noted, “perhaps the purpose of the
rules is simply to hold up a target to the courts; call one the Frye target and the
other the Daubert target.  The Frye ideal says:  Do whatever the experts tell you
to do.  The Daubert ideal says:  Figure out the science yourself.”230  In figuring it
out for themselves, judges have moved steadily toward the interpretive prac-
220. These types go by a number of different names: experiential vs. rational; associative vs. rule
based; heuristic vs. systematic.  See DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 73, 323, 627
(Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
221. See Seymour Epstein & Rosemary Pacini, Some Basic Issues Regarding Dual-Process Theories
from the Perspective of Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 220, at 466.
222. For a fuller discussion of expert testimony from the point of view of dual process theories, see
Sanders, supra note 104.
223. See Epstein & Pacini, supra note 221, at 466.
224. See, e.g., Cartwright v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 900, 907 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
225. See In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1230 (D. Colo. 1998).
226. A similar trend may be occurring in products liability design defect litigation.  See Jaurequi v.
Carter Mfg. Co., Inc., 173 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 1999).
227. See Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative Encounters with
Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1075 (1998).
228. See id. at 1077.
229. To be sure, the opinion allows judges to make use of surrogate indicia of reliability.  Peer re-
view and publication and general acceptance in the scientific community are factors judges may con-
sider, but they are secondary to a direct assessment of the testimony’s scientific validity.
230. Saks, supra note 227, at 1139.
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tices of science.231  Those interpretive practices—the generally accepted types of
arguments and data interpretation that define the interpretive community of
science—typically involve rational processing.232  In this area at least, the inter-
pretive communities of science and law have tended to converge.233  By its re-
fusal to distinguish between scientific experts and other experts, Kumho has
reinforced this movement in areas such as differential diagnosis.
Zuchowicz v. United States is an example of a case where the style of rea-
soning in the expert testimony arguably made a difference in an otherwise diffi-
cult causal argument.234  The experts’ conclusion was primarily based on tempo-
231. Alvin Goldman provides one list of the dimensions of scientific practice. They include:
(1) An emphasis on precise measurement, controlled test, and observation, including a phi-
losophy, organon, and technology for more and more powerful observation.
(2) A systematic and sophisticated set of inferential principles for drawing conclusions about
hypotheses from observations of experimental results.
ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 250 (1999).
232. We do not mean to suggest that there is only one scientific interpretive community.  At a philo-
sophical and sociological level, there is much disagreement about how scientists know.  We make the
more modest point that appeals to professional judgment or intuition based on experiential processing
of information are generally outside the boundaries of legitimate scientific epistemology.  See STEPHEN
COLE, MAKING SCIENCE: BETWEEN NATURE AND SOCIETY (1992); PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: THE
CENTRAL ISSUES (Martin Curd & J.A. Cover eds., 1998); THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (David
Papineau ed., 1996).
233. The idea of interpretive communities in law is usually associated with Stanley Fish.  See
STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF
THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989).
234. The following description of their testimony is taken from the opinion:
1. Dr. Matthay
Dr. Richard Matthay is a full professor of medicine at Yale and Associate Director
and Training Director of Yale’s Pulmonary and Critical Care Section.  He is a nationally
recognized expert in the field of pulmonary medicine, with extensive experience in the
area of drug-induced pulmonary diseases.  Dr. Matthay examined and treated Mrs.
Zuchowicz.  His examination included taking a detailed history of the progression of her
disease, her medical history, and the timing of her Danocrine overdose and the onset of
her symptoms.
Dr. Matthay testified that he was confident to a reasonable medical certainty that
the Danocrine caused Mrs. Zuchowicz’s PPH. When pressed, he added that he believed
the overdose of Danocrine to have been responsible for the disease. His conclusion was
based on the temporal relationship between the overdose and the start of the disease and
the differential etiology method of excluding other possible causes.  While Dr. Matthay
did not rule out all other possible causes of pulmonary hypertension, he did exclude all
the causes of secondary pulmonary hypertension.  On the basis of Mrs. Zuchowicz’s his-
tory, he also ruled out all previously known drug-related causes of primary pulmonary
hypertension.
Dr. Matthay further testified that the progression and timing of Mrs. Zuchowicz’s
disease in relation to her overdose supported a finding of drug- induced PPH.  Dr. Mat-
thay emphasized that, prior to the overdose, Mrs. Zuchowicz was a healthy, active young
woman with no history of cardiovascular problems, and that, shortly after the overdose,
she began experiencing symptoms of PPH such as weight gain, swelling of hands and feet,
fatigue, and shortness of breath.  He described the similarities between the course of Mrs.
Zuchowicz’s illness and that of accepted cases of drug-induced PPH, and he went on to
discuss cases involving classes of drugs that are known to cause other pulmonary diseases
(mainly anti-cancer drugs).  He noted that the onset of these diseases, which are recog-
nized to be caused by the particular drugs, was very similar in timing  and course to the
development of Mrs. Zuchowicz’s illness.
2. Dr. Tackett
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ral order.  But their testimony also was fully within the rational processing style.
It was analytic, it relied more on abstract symbols, and it was process-oriented.
Both the trial court and the Second Circuit found it to be admissible.235
If our argument is correct, then testimony that is both in a rational-
processing style and is supported by higher quality causal information is more
likely to be admitted.  One should note, however, that these are not entirely
separate criteria.  The definition of what constitutes higher-quality causal in-
formation is greatly affected by whether the information itself is presented in
this style.  The very ability to construct a plausible rational processing style ar-
gument is in part contingent on the existence of research done and presented in
this way.  In this sense, style and substance are inevitably intertwined.
VI
CONCLUSION
This article has focused on one of the more difficult causal issues in torts to-
day, the proof of specific causation in toxic tort suits.  Typically, plaintiffs’ ex-
perts attempt to prove specific causation through a process that the courts have
called differential diagnosis.  Given the difficulty of the question, it is not sur-
prising that courts have made inconsistent pronouncements on issues such as
ruling-in before ruling-out and the sufficiency of temporal order evidence.
What is surprising is the fair degree of consensus that has been achieved on
these questions.  Moreover, a number of the opinions in the minority on these
issues can be reconciled with the majority view based on the strength of the
causal information available and the way in which the experts presented the
evidence.
We believe that it is fair to say that differential diagnosis testimony gener-
ally is looked upon with greater skepticism than was the case prior to the Dau-
bert revolution.  Courts are less likely to admit the testimony.  In part, this is be-
cause in the toxic tort arena plaintiffs are attempting more difficult causal
arguments.  We believe it is also because courts have become more demanding
by requiring better science before admitting testimony.  Justice Cornyn was
right to be concerned in Robinson.  With respect to harm to both the plants in
Robinson and the people in the differential diagnosis cases, plaintiffs are held to
a more rigorous standard.
Dr. Randall Tackett is a tenured, full professor of pharmacology and former de-
partment chair from the University of Georgia.  He has published widely in the field of
the effects of drugs on vascular tissues.  Dr. Tackett testified that, to a reasonable degree
of scientific certainty, he believed that the overdose of Danocrine, more likely than not,
caused PPH in the plaintiff by producing: 1) a decrease in estrogen; 2) hyperinsulinemia,
in which abnormally high levels of insulin circulate in the body; and 3) increases in free
testosterone and progesterone.  Dr. Tackett testified that these hormonal factors, taken
together, likely caused a dysfunction of the endothelium leading to PPH. Dr. Tackett re-
lied on a variety of published and unpublished studies that indicated that these hormones
could cause endothelial dysfunction and an imbalance of vasoconstrictor effects.
140 F.3d 381, 385-86 (2d Cir. 1998).
235. See Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 387.
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A lesson to be drawn from this discussion is that the adjective law of evi-
dence and the substantive law of causation are also intertwined.  If all that an
expert could say in support of her opinion is that it is widely shared by other
experts who have considered the question, most courts would refuse to let her
take the stand.  In this sense, Frye has been banished from federal courts.  Its
departure has altered not only evidentiary law on admissibility of expert testi-
mony, but also the substantive tort law of what is necessary to prove a causal
connection based on a differential diagnosis.
